Wednesday, August 12, 2015

The Camel and the Coase Theorem

This article talks about the City of Richmond's noise ordinances and whether or not they should be altered. The author in the article references the Coase Theorem and proceeds to give the theory and a real world application behind the story. 


Why doesn't the Coase Theorem work with the current ordinance. My understanding is that individuals own the right to silence under the current ordinance and demand that the city send out a trained officer with one of fourteen city-purchased decibel meters when someone violates that right. Couldn't Camel offer compensation to the people adversely affected to purchase their agreement not to demand public action and, thereby, reach an efficient solution?

My understanding is that the variance requested by Camel shifts the property right away from people who own silence to people who own the right to make noise for additional hours of the day. How would this transfer of property rights affect the outcome in the Coase Theorem assuming transactions costs are nil? Would the level of noise change? Who would win and who would lose?

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